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CORPORATE VENUE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
CASES
INTRODUCTION
Congress recently amended the general corporate venue provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c), by passing the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act of 1988 ("Act").' The Act, which became effective February 16, 1989,
made the test for corporate residency under the federal venue provisions the
same as that used to determine when personal jurisdiction exists over a de-
fendant. The literal language of the Act extends this definition of corporate
residence to the venue provision that governs patent infringement actions.'
With this amendment to section 1391(c), Congress overruled Supreme Court
precedent that restricted the scope of section 1391(c) as it applies to patent
venue cases. Such an effect seems inadvertent based on the legislative history
of the Act.
This Note examines the amendment to section 1391(c) ("Amendment")
contained in the Act. After providing a summary of the development of juris-
diction in the federal courts, Section I of this Note discusses the state of pat-
ent venue law prior to the Amendment. Section II discusses the legislative
history of the Amendment and the Amendment itself. Section III presents an
interpretation of the Amendment using established rules of statutory construc-
tion. Section III then discusses the changes to the patent venue structure that
result from a literal interpretation of amended section 1391(c). In addition,
this Section compares the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the spe-
cial patent venue statute, to the legislative history of the amended section
1391(c) in an effort to glean Congress' intent in passing the Amendment. Fi-
nally, Section IV discusses current judicial interpretations of amended section
1391(c) and their impact on corporate defendants in patent infringement
cases. This Note concludes that Congress may not have intended the effect
that a literal reading of amended section 1391(c) has on the patent venue
requirements.
I. BACKGROUND
In patent infringement actions, as in all civil actions, the requirements of
1. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (1982)).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988) (controlling venue in patent infringement actions and providing
that a defendant in a patent infringement action may be sued in the district where the defendant
"resides"). A patent is a grant made by the government to an inventor, giving him the exclusive
right to make, use, and sell his invention for a term of years. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (defin-
ing patent infringement). Thus, patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, or selling
of a patented work. Id.
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proper jurisdiction and venue limit the plaintiff's choice of forum. Plaintiff's
chosen forum must have both subject matter jurisdiction over the issues the
parties will litigate and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' Proper venue
is governed by statute. Title 28, section 1391 of the United States Code con-
tains the general federal venue requirements." Section 1400(b) is a special
venue provision governing patent infringement actions. 5
For purposes of this Note, it is important to distinguish venue from jurisdic-
tion. While the effect of each is to limit the choice of a proper forum, the focus
of each is different. The focus under jurisdiction is on the power of a court to
adjudicate, whereas the focus under venue is on the place where that power
may be exercised.6
Two significant consequences flow from the distinction between venue and
jurisdiction. First, proper venue is a personal privilege of the defendant, rather
than an absolute stricture on the court, and thus it may be waived.7 Second,
the existence of proper jurisdiction does not eliminate the concurrent requisite
of proper venue.8
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
This Section of the Note outlines the state of the law regarding jurisdiction
and venue generally, and as it stands with respect to civil actions for patent
infringement. First, this Section briefly discusses the subject matter jurisdic-
3. The plaintiff's choice of a proper forum is also limited by the requirements for making
proper service of process on the defendant. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see also Welch Scientific Co. v.
Human Eng'g Inst., 416 F.2d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1969), (discussing possible ways to make proper
service in patent infringement cases), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988). Even if the forum chosen by the plaintiff satisfies the require-
ments of proper jurisdiction and venue, a court has discretionary power to decline jurisdiction
when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice so require. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988).
This is known as the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
6. See Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) (distinguishing venue
from jurisdiction); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939)
("The jurisdiction of the federal courts-their power to adjudicate-is a grant of authority to
them by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants to confer. But the locality of a law-
suit-the place where judicial authority may be exercised-though defined by legislation relates to
the convenience of litigants and as such is subject to their disposition."). See generally 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D §
3801 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE] (distinguishing venue from
jurisdiction).
7. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180 (venue is like personal jurisdiction which may also be waived, but
unlike subject matter jurisdiction which may not be waived by the parties); see Neirbo, 308 U.S.
at 167-68 (venue is a personal privilege); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1988) (providing that
"[niothing in this chapter [on district court venue] shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court
of any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the
venue").
8. See Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that an action may not be
maintained against a defendant objecting to venue even though the court may have both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction).
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tion of the federal courts. Next, this Section summarizes the evolution of the
law of personal jurisdiction. Finally, this Section presents the state of the law
under the federal venue statutes as it existed prior to the amendment to sec-
tion 1391(c).
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The federal court chosen by the plaintiff must have subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the issues to be litigated.9 It is a fundamental principle of our federal
system of law that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 10 They
are empowered to hear only those cases that are both within the judicial power
of the United States as defined in the Constitution, and that have been en-
trusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Congress."
It is presumed that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case
until the plaintiff demonstrates that jurisdiction over the subject matter ex-
ists. 2 Thus, the facts showing the existence of jurisdiction must be alleged
affirmatively in the complaint. 13 In addition, as a general rule, the parties may
not confer jurisdiction on a court where it has not been vested in that court by
the Constitution and Congress."' Finally, a party or the court has the right to
question the existence of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.'5
Patent actions fall exclusively within the realm of the limited jurisdiction of
the federal courts.' 6 Patent actions are within the judicial power of the United
States as defined in the Constitution, 7 and these cases have been entrusted to
9. Because the federal courts have limited jurisdiction, the complaint must state claims which
fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court as defined in title 28. See infra notes
10-13 and accompanying text.
10. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 22 (4th ed. 1983). See generally 15
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3522 (2d ed. 1986) (federal courts empowered to
hear only those cases that are both within the judicial power of the United States and that have
been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant).
II. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ("Federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress."); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (granting exclusive federal jurisdiction over matters arising out
of the patent laws); 13 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3521, at 52 (2d ed. 1984)
("The traditional learning has been that Congress has no constitutional power to vest any jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts that is not listed in Article IIl.").
12. C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 7, at 22. See generally 13 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 6, § 3522 (2d ed. 1984) (plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts showing the existence
of federal jurisdiction).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l).
14. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975) (the parties to the action may not stipulate to
waive lack of jurisdiction).
15. Most procedural defects and defenses are waived if a party fails to timely assert them, but
it is specifically provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) that "[whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action." (emphasis added).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ...."); U.S. CONST. art. 1,
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the federal courts by a jurisdictional grant from Congress." Thus, the subject
matter of patent actions falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 19
Should a party choose to appeal an adverse decision of the federal district
court, they may only obtain review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the patent subject mat-
ter.2" In 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.2 The Federal Circuit was formed through the merger of the
United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals,22 and has adopted the decisions of those courts as precedent.2"
This court functions like the other federal appellate courts, except that its
§ 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries. ... )
18. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1988). Section 1338(a) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ...cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
19. The federal courts have not always exercised exclusive jurisdiction over patent actions. The
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, set the structure for patent litigation by giving the
patentee a judicial remedy for infringement. Id. § 4. The Act of Apr. 10, 1790 did not specify
which courts were to have subject matter jurisdiction over infringement actions, but natural infer-
ence was that only state courts would have jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not
give the lower federal courts jurisdiction over actions arising under federal law. See Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 78.
The federal courts were later given concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts, Act of Feb. 21,
1793, ch. I1, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, and then finally were vested with exclusive jurisdiction, Act of Apr.
17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37.
Several rationales have been advanced by commentators to explain why the federal courts were
given exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in this area. See, e.g., Chisum, The Allocation of Juris-
diction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 637
(1971); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L.
REV, 509, 511-12 (1957) (advancing the theories that (1) Congress intended to promote uniform-
ity of decision on important issues of patent law by concentrating infringement actions in the
federal judiciary, and (2) the concentration of infringement actions in the federal courts would
allow them to develop the expertise necessary to decide the technical problems so frequently
raised). Chisum poses that "[m]ore likely the reasons were more prosaic .... One reason may
have been simply a perceived impropriety in allowing a state court to annul the act of a high
federal officer." Chisum, supra, at 637 (emphasis in original). Chisum argues another possible
reason may have been that the Patent Act of 1800 provided for treble damages. Id. It could thus
be viewed as penal, thereby making state jurisdiction improper because it would result in the
courts of one sovereign enforcing the criminal laws of another.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
21. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), codified
in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is an Article III
court at the same level as the existing courts of appeals. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3 (1981).
22. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
23. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). South
Corp. was the first appeal heard, and the first opinion published, by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See id. at 1369.
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jurisdiction is defined by subject matter rather than by geography."' This sub-
ject matter jurisdiction includes exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from
all federal district courts. 5
The need for uniformity in patent law was the driving factor behind the
creation of the Federal Circuit. 6 Congress recognized that patent litigation
was a problem area in the federal courts,27 characterized by undue forum
shopping and disturbing inconsistencies in adjudication. 8 Plaintiffs had come
to regard some circuits as "pro-patent" and others as "anti-patent," and spent
much time and money shopping for a favorable forum.2 9 The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, whose decisions are given nationwide precedential ef-
fect,30 was created to alleviate these problems.3 1
2. Personal Jurisdiction
In addition to the subject matter requirement, the federal forum chosen by
the plaintiff must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 2 Personal ju-
risdiction is based on concepts of due process.33 The modern standard for per-
sonal jurisdiction, as first pronounced in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 34 is that the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum so
that the maintenance of a suit against him in that locale does not offend tradi-
tional notions of "fair play and substantial justice."35 This standard is known
24. See H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1981) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
26. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 20-23.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 20-21.
29. Id. (quoting from the report of the Hruska Commission on the deplorable state of patent
law with regard to forum shopping: "[p]atentees now scramble to get into the 5th, 6th, and 7th
circuits since the courts there are not inhospitable to patents whereas infringers scramble to get
anywhere but in these circuits").
30. See Lever, The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (pt. 1) 64 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y. 178, 186-97 (1982) (presenting a history of the efforts to obtain consolidation).
31. See HousE REPORT, supra note 24, at 20-23.
32. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D. §
1067 (2d ed. 1987); see also Omni Capital Int'l. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987)
(determining that the jurisdiction of a federal court, even in federal question cases, was limited by
the forum state's long-arm statute and not by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, in
the absence of a statutory provision for nationwide service of process).
33. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945) (jurisdiction must be con-
sistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
35. Id. at 316. See generally I J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, T 0.140[1-.2] (2d ed.
1972) (providing a general discussion of the "minimum contacts" standard); 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 32, § 1063 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing modern notions of personal jurisdiction).
A review of the history of personal jurisdiction is helpful in understanding the concurrent devel-
opment of venue. The Judiciary Act of 1789, § I1, 1 Stat. 78, provided that a civil action could be
commenced by serving a person in the district in which he was an inhabitant at the time of the
serving of the writ.
In the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the United States Supreme
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as the "minimum contacts" test. 6
Questions of personal jurisdiction involve three competing interests: the
plaintiff's, the defendant's, and the forum state's.87 When analyzing personal
jurisdiction questions, the Supreme Court has not addressed these interests in
a consistent manner. 88 Early cases clearly focused on the defendant's inter-
ests. 9 In more recent cases, however, the Court has bifurcated the inquiry.
First, as a threshold question, the Court determines whether the defendant has
purposefully established "minimum contacts" with the forum.4 0 Second, the
Court determines whether its exercise of personal jurisdiction conforms with
"fair play and substantial justice.141 Under the second part of this inquiry, the
Court balances the three interests noted above.4 2 The relative weight which
courts are to give to each part of the inquiry remains unsettled.43
a. The early development of minimum contacts
International Shoe marked the Court's departure from a territorial analysis
of personal jurisdiction." The Supreme Court in International Shoe used the
Court mandated a territorial concept of personal jurisdiction. The Court limited personal jurisdic-
tion to those situations in which an individual defendant could be personally served within the
jurisdiction or had consented to jurisdiction. Id. It was not until the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury that the Supreme Court firmly declared that domicile and extraterritorial service would sup-
port an in personam judgment. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
Under the territorialist approach, jurisdiction over corporate defendants was more restrictive
than jurisdiction over individuals. An individual defendant could be served and subjected to suit
wherever he was found, but a corporation existed as a legal person only in the state of its incorpo-
ration and could only be served there. Louisville C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844).
Along with the expansion of the general law of personal jurisdiction over an individual, personal
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant expanded. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 32,
§ 1066 (2d ed. 1987); see also Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963)
("The existence of corporations which could-and did--do business on a nationwide scale necessi-
tated revision of older, more limited, notions concerning jurisdiction.").
36. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts, 39 S.C.L. REV. 729, 733 (1988).
37. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (finding that plaintiff's
interest in his ability to bring suit, and the forum state's interest in providing redress for its
citizens, outweighed the defendant's interest in defending in a convenient forum).
38. Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945) (stating that
the focus under due process is on the defendant) with McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24 (balancing the
interests of the plaintiff, the forum, and the defendant). See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying
text for a discussion of McGee.
39. See, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-20.
40. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987); see infra
notes 101-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Asahi.
41. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-13.
42. Id. at 113-16.
43. Id. (producing two four-Justice plurality opinions and a third opinion of three Justices).
44. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Court in Interna-
tional Shoe derived four general categories from its prior jurisdictional decisions to be used in
determining whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum to permit the assertion
of jurisdiction. Id. at 317-18. The International Shoe Court presented the following categories:
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"fair play and substantial justice" standard to determine whether the defend-
ant had "minimum contacts" with the forum.' 5 Under the International Shoe
minimum contacts framework, two questions must be addressed: first, whether
the defendant's activities within the forum are continuous and systematic, or
only sporadic and casual, and second, whether the cause of action sued upon is
related or unrelated to the defendant's conduct in the forum.' 6 Both of these
International Shoe inquiries focus on the defendant and his contacts with the
forum.' The Court did not identify any other criteria to evaluate the fairness
or reasonableness of maintaining a suit against the defendant in the forum. 8
In a later case, however, the focus of the court shifted somewhat from the
defendant to the plaintiff.'9
In McGee v. International Life Insurance,"° the Court moved away from the
International Shoe analysis, which focused on the defendant's contacts with
the forum state, and adopted an interest-based analysis.61 In evaluating per-
sonal jurisdiction, the Court focused on the interest of the forum state,52 the
plaintiff's interest,53 and general litigation concerns.5 ' It also considered the
(I) A defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in a forum in which its
activities have been continuous and systematic, and have given rise to the cause of
action sued upon;
(2) The sporadic or casual activities of a defendant in the forum, or his single isolated
act there, are not enough to subject that defendant to suit in the forum on causes of
action unrelated to his forum activities;
(3) The continuous activity of a defendant within the forum may be of such nature as
to subject the defendant to jurisdiction even upon causes of action unrelated to his
forurIh activities; and
(4) A defendant's sporadic forum activity, even a single act, may suffice under certain
circumstances to render him subject to jurisdiction upon claims arising out of that
activity.
Id. These categories did not define "minimum contacts" per se. A bright-line rule defining mini-
mum contacts requirements is not possible because due process concerns are often fact-specific.
See id. at 319 ("It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be
simply mechanical or quantitative .... Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
....."). The categories were designed to describe permissible and prohibited assertions of personal
jurisdiction by reference to the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.
Id.
45. Id. at 317-19.
46. Id. at 317-18; see supra note 44 (discussing the interplay of the two questions in terms of
four general categories).
47. Id. at 318-19 (a corporation which exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a
state enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state, and thus should be amenable to
suit arising out of, or connected with, such activities).
48. See 13 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3522 (2d ed. 1984).
49. McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
50. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
51. See id. at 223-24.
52. Id. at 223 ("it cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effec-
tive means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.").
53. Id. The Court, in addressing the plaintiff's interest, stated:
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defendant's interest in avoiding an inconvenient forum.55 After weighing these
interests, the Court noted the trend of expanding state court jurisdiction56 and
concluded that the California court properly exercised personal jurisdiction
over the Texas defendant.57
The defendant in McGee, a Texas insurance company, had assumed the ob-
ligations of a predecessor company, including one life insurance policy for a
resident of California.58 The defendant offered to renew the California policy
by mailing a written renewal offer to the insured in California.50 The offer was
accepted by the insured, 0 who paid premiums for two years by mail from
California to the Texas office of the defendant."1 The defendant later refused
to pay on the policy. In concluding that the California court properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court considered several factors:
California's interest in providing a means for its residents to recover on their
claims, the plaintiff's interest in not allowing the foreign defendant to act with
impunity because the expenses of foreign suits are prohibitive, the defendant's
interest in avoiding suit in an inconvenient forum, and a "litigation" interest in
access to crucial witnesses.6" Collectively, these elements weighed in favor of
the exercise of jurisdiction by California.6"
In the same term as McGee, the Court again faced a personal jurisdiction
question in Hanson v. Denckla." In Hanson, the Court turned away from
[The California] residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to
follow the insurance company to a distant state in order to hold it legally accountable.
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford
the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company
judgment proof.
Id.
54. Id. (recognizing the likelihood of finding crucial witnesses in the insured's locality as a
litigation interest).
55. Id. at 224.
56. Id. at 222-23. The Court observed:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernable to-
ward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation
of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch
two or more states .... With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a
great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the
same time, modern transportation and communication have made it much less bur-
densome for a party sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic
activity.
Id.
57. Id. at 223 ("[T]he suit was based on a contract which had a substantial connection with
[California].").
58. Id. at 221.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 222.
62. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
63. McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
64. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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McGee's interest-based approach and returned to an analysis which focused on
the defendant's contacts.68 However, the Court redefined the International
Shoe minimum contacts standard.66 The Court held that the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state must be purposeful in order for personal jurisdiction
to exist within that forum.67 The Court stated:
65. See id. at 251-53; see also Stravitz, supra note 36, at 737-45.
66. Professor Stravitz argues that the limitations of the simplistic International Shoe test led to
its modification. Stravitz, supra note 36, at 744 n.80. According to Stravitz:
The Hanson Court failed to make use of the International Shoe categories distilled
from pre-International Shoe case law. The Hanson fact pattern illustrates how diffi-
cult it is to limit the description of a nonresident's forum state activities to two broad
classifications: casual and occasional or systematic and continuous. While a defend-
ant's forum state activity may be systematic and continuous in the sense that it occurs
at regular intervals, it may only represent a very limited part of the nonresident's
national or international business. Moreover, if certain single acts are sufficient to
confer jurisdiction, there is no significance to classifying a nonresident defendant's
activity as casual and occasional.
Id.
67. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. In Hanson, a Pennsylvania domiciliary executed a trust instru-
ment in Delaware, and named a Delaware bank as trustee. Id. at 238. The trust instrument gave
the settlor, during her lifetime, a power of appointment over the remainder in the trust. Id. The
settlor later became a domiciliary of Florida. While in Florida,- she purported to exercise her
power of appointment, appointing a large portion of the trust to two other trusts previously estab-
lished in Delaware. Id. at 239.
After the settlor's death, the residuary legatees brought an action in Florida contending that the
power of appointment had not been exercised effectively. Id. at 240. Extraterritorial service was
made on the Delaware trustees by mail and by publication. Id. Several defendants challenged the
jurisdiction of the Florida court. Id. at 241. The Florida court concluded that it had jurisdiction
over the trustee, that the trust was invalid, and thus, that the exercise of the power of appointment
was ineffective. Id. at 238.
Before the Florida judgment was rendered, one of the settlor's daughters commenced an action
in Delaware seeking a declaratory judgment on the validity of the exercise of the power of ap-
pointment. Id. at 242. The Delaware court held that the trust and the exercise of the power of
appointment were valid, and refused to be bound by the Florida judgment. Id. at 243.
The Supreme Court, hearing both cases under its certiorari jurisdiction, faced the issue of
whether the Florida court had properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.
Id. at 238, 244. The Supreme Court held that the Florida court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the Delaware trustee. Id. at 253. It found that the Delaware trustee's contacts with Florida
were insufficient to be subject to suit there. Id. at 251. The Court noted that the trust company
had no office in Florida and transacted no business there, that none of the trust assets had ever
been held or administered in Florida, and that there had been no solicitation of business in Florida
by the trust company. Id. It also stated that the cause of action was not one arising out of an act
performed, or transaction consummated, in Florida. Id. at 251-52. Further, the Court found that
the unilateral acts of the settlor, in moving to Florida and exercising her power of appointment
there, were not enough to create jurisdiction over the trustee. Id. at 253. While recognizing the
trend noted in McGee to expand state court jurisdiction, the language of the Court focused
squarely on sovereignty and territorial limitations. Id. at 251. The Court, critical of McGee,
observed:
[lit is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restric-
tions on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts. Those restrictions are more than
a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states.
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The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresi-
dent defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State. The application of [the minimum contacts] rule will vary with the
quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protection of its laws.68
Hanson's "purposeful availment" requirement is now commonly viewed as a
critical element in jurisdictional due process.6
b. Recent minimum contacts developments
The Court attempted to define the outer boundaries of personal jurisdiction
in the more recent' case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson."0 In
this decision, the Court again de-emphasized the interests of the forum state
and the plaintiff in deciding whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, and placed in the foreground the Hanson require-
ment of purposeful availment.7 The World-Wide opinion asserted that the
functions of the minimum contacts concept were to protect the defendant and
to ensure that states did not exceed their sovereign limits.72 World-Wide is
significant because while the language of International Shoe set out "fair play
and substantial justice" as the standard against which the sufficiency of the
contacts is to be measured, the World-Wide Court explicitly adopted a bifur-
cated approach which characterized the minimum contacts inquiry as a
threshold question.7 Thus, under World-Wide, only when minimum contacts
are found to exist do fair play and substantial justice become relevant
considerations.
Id. (citation omitted).
In reasserting the International Shoe focus on the defendant, the Court noted that the issue was
one of personal jurisdiction and not choice of law. "[The issue of personal jurisdiction] is resolved
in this case by considering the acts of the trustee." Id. at 254.
68. Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
70. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide, two New York residents brought a product liability
suit in Oklahoma state court for injuries sustained in a car accident. Id. at 288. The defendants
included the New York retailer who sold them their car, the New York regional distributor, the
car's international manufacturer, and the national importer. Id. The plaintiffs were on an
Oklahoma freeway, en route to their new home in Arizona, when their car was rear-ended, ruptur-
ing the gas tank and causing a fire. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 291-92.
73. Id. The bifurcated approach employed in World-Wide was not part of the International
Shoe test. In International Shoe, the Court simply asked whether the defendant's contacts with
the forum were sufficient, under the standard of "fair play and substantial justice," to allow the
district court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
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In World-Wide, the Supreme Court refused to allow an Oklahoma court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York automobile retailer and its re-
gional distributor because it found no "contacts, ties, or relations" between
them and the Oklahoma forum." The plaintiff argued that as a result of a
car's inherent mobility it was foreseeable that the car would cause injury in
Oklahoma, thereby making it fair to assert personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants there.75 The Court held that foreseeability alone, without "affiliating
circumstances" by which the defendant avails himself of the privileges and
benefits of the forum state's law, cannot support jurisdiction.76 In discussing
the lack of affiliating circumstances in World-Wide, the Court noted that peti-
tioners did not solicit business in Oklahoma either through salespersons or
through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the state.7 7 Similarly, peti-
tioners did not directly, or through others, regularly sell cars at wholesale or
retail to Oklahoma residents.7 8 This standard for minimum contacts has been
labelled the "stream of commerce" variation of the purposeful availment re-
quirement.7 9 Thus, the World-Wide case indicates that a court may find pur-
poseful conduct by the defendant when he engages in activity within the forum
state, or places goods into the stream of commerce, and it is foreseeable that a
suit may be filed in the forum state."
Justice Brennan's opinion in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 1 set forth a
new two-branch approach to personal jurisdiction." Justice Brennan's ap-
proach has been characterized as the joinder of McGee's multi-interest balanc-
ing approach with Hanson's purposeful availment analysis.83 The first branch
may be characterized as the "traditional minimum contacts" branch.84 Once it
has been established that a defendant purposefully established minimum con-
tacts within the forum state, these contacts are considered in light of the fac-
tors under the second branch, which may be characterized as the "fairness"
branch.8 Under Justice Brennan's formulation, the "fairness" branch seem-
74. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295, 298-99.
75. Id. at 295.
76. Id. at 295-97.
77. Id. at 295.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 298.
80. See id at 297-98.
81. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
82. See id. at 471-78; see also Stravitz, supra note 36, at 777 (describing the new two-branch
approach to state court personal jurisdiction as a "fundamental transformation of jurisdictional
due process").
83. Stravitz, supra note 36, at 753, 774-75.
84. Id. at 777.
85. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985); see also Stravitz, supra
note 36, at 777-81. The five factors from World-Wide which courts may evaluate in "appropriate
cases" include the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the
several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
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ingly dominates. The Court stated that "fairness" considerations "sometimes
serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required,"86 or on the other hand,
"may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has pur-
posefully engaged in forum activities." 87
The Burger King litigation arose from a dispute between Burger King Cor-
poration, a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami,
and one of its franchisees. 88 Appellee, Rudzewicz, a domiciliary of Michigan,
and his partner applied jointly to Burger King's Birmingham, Michigan dis-
trict office for a franchise.88 Although Rudzewicz and his partner essentially
dealt with the Birmingham district office, they also had communication with
Burger King's headquarters in Miami. 90 They signed a franchise agreement
with Burger King and commenced operation of a Burger King restaurant in
Michigan. 9' The franchise soon experienced financial difficulties and defaulted
on payments due under the franchise agreement. 92 Burger King terminated
the franchise and demanded that Rudzewicz relinquish possession of the
Michigan facility.93 When Rudzewicz refused, Burger King commenced an
action for breach of contract and trademark infringement in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida.94
The Florida district court rejected the defendants' personal jurisdiction chal-
lenge and found in favor of Burger King on the substantive claims. 9 The Elev-
enth Circuit reversed on the ground that jurisdiction in Florida was fundamen-
tally unfair because the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the
franchise agreement and the operation of the restaurant did not provide
Rudzewicz with reasonable notice of the possibility of litigation in Florida.96
The Supreme Court reversed.97 The Court concluded that the "traditional"
branch of the test for personal jurisdiction was satisfied because Rudzewicz
deliberately and knowingly formed a long-term relationship with an entity
headquartered in the forum state, and as a result, he should have reasonably
anticipated forum state litigation.98 Turning then to the "fairness" branch, the
86. Id.
87. Id. at 478.
88. Id. at 465.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 467 & n.7.
91. Id. at 467-68.
92. Id. at 468.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 468-69. Florida's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to "[any person . . . who
[b]reach[es] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be
performed in this state." Id. at 463 (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.193(l)(g) (Supp. 1984)).
95. Id. at 469.
96. Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, reh'g denied, Burger King Corp. v. Mac-
shara, 729 F.2d. 1468 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985).
97. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481-82 (1985).
98. Id.
[Vol. 40:207
PATENT VENUE
Court concluded that Rudzewicz failed to establish that jurisdiction in Florida
would be unreasonable."
Burger King's joinder of McGee's multi-interest balancing approach with
Hanson's purposeful availment analysis did not merge the two doctrines into a
uniform test providing predictable results.100 The next Supreme Court case
which addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction, Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court,'°' producing two four-Justice plurality opirions and a third
opinion of three Justices, illustrated the disagreement within the Court with
respect to the soundness of the Burger King test.' °2 Asahi arose from a'1978
collision involving a motorcyclist and the driver of a tractor-trailer on a Cali-
fornia highway. °1 The motorcyclist, a California resident, was severely in-
jured and his wife was killed. 04 He filed a product liability suit in California
alleging that one of the motorcycle's tires was defective. 10' The complaint
named, inter alia, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co. ("Cheng Shin"), the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube. 0 6 Cheng Shin subsequently filed a pross-
complaint seeking indemnification from its codefendants and from Asahi
Metal Industry Co. ("Asahi"), the manufacturer of the tire's valve
assembly.107
The California Supreme Court found the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi
to be consistent with the due process clause. 08 Asahi appealed and the Su-
preme Court reversed.' 09 Although all nine Justices concurred in the judgment
reversing the California Supreme Court, the Court was deeply divided over the
proper reasoning for its result. In each of the opinions filed, the Justices ap-
plied the two-branch Burger King framework." 0 Under the "traditional mini-
mum contacts" branch, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, maintained that minimum contacts were established based on
Asahi's awareness that its products would be marketed in California."' Jus-
99. Id. at 482-85.
100. Stravitz, supra note 36, at 783.
101. 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion).
102. Id. at 105, 116, 121.
103. Id. at 105.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 106.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543 (1985). The
California Supreme Court observed that Asahi had no offices, property, or agents in California,
solicited no business there, made no direct sales there, and did not design or control the distribu-
tion system that carried its product there. Nonetheless, the court found Asahi's intentional act of
placing its components into the stream of commerce, together with Asahi's awareness that some of
the components would enter California, sufficient to allow the California court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over Asahi. Id.
109. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
110. See id. at 112-13.
Ill. Id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring). The division between the O'Connor and Brennan
pluralities was attributable to the different interpretations each opinion gave to World-Wide's
stream-of-commerce dicta. The O'Connor plurality concluded that due process requires more than
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tice O'Connor's plurality opinion concluded that minimum contacts had not
been established because Asahi did not purposefully direct its business activity
to California."' Despite finding that minimum contacts had not been estab-
lished, the O'Connor plurality addressed the fairness branch." 3 This leaves
some doubt as to whether the minimum contacts inquiry is still considered a
threshold matter. Both the O'Connor plurality and the Brennan plurality con-
cluded that California's assertion of jurisdiction was unreasonable under the
fairness branch.
Asahi is the Supreme Court's last word on the subject of personal jurisdic-
tion. Asahi's modification of the Burger King test requires the federal courts
to consider whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts
in the forum state, and whether the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant would offend traditional notions of "fair play and substan-
tial justice" under the particular circumstances." 4 As a result of the division
of the Asahi Court, the order and relationship of these two inquiries has be-
come uncertain.,
c. Application of the "minimum contacts" test to corporate defendants
As discussed above, the test for proper jurisdiction over the person is the
"minimum contacts" test. The "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdic-
tion applies to corporate defendants, as well as individuals.," Traditionally,
personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over a corporate defendant except
in the place of its incorporation."' This restrictive territorial view of personal
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant was based on the concept of the fic-
tional corporate entity which, as a creature of state statute, was deemed to
mere "awareness," id. at 112, and that the connection between the defendant and the forum state
must come about by some act of the defendant. Id. Justice Brennan's plurality stated that mere
awareness that a product was being distributed in the forum state was sufficient to satisfy mini-
mum contacts under the first branch of the Burger King test. Id. at 116-20.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, expressed the opinion that "[aln examination of
minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction is constitutional." Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). Instead of taking a black
or white view of the stream-of-commerce theory, Justice Stevens would evaluate each component
part by the objective criteria of volume, value, and hazardous character. Id. at 121-22.
112, Id. at 108-13.
113. Id. at 113-16. Although Justice O'Connor's opinion failed to find minimum contacts, it
went on to evaluate the "fairness" branch factors and concluded that, in any event, California's
assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi was unreasonable. Id. at 114-15. Justice Brennan agreed, find-
ing Asahi the rare case in which the "fairness" branch defeats the "traditional minimum con-
tacts" branch. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also joined Justice O'Connor
in her fairness branch analysis. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). Only Justice Scalia failed to
join this part of Justice O'Connor's opinion. However, Justice Scalia did not choose to write sepa-
rately on this issue.
114. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
115. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (applying the "mini-
mum contacts" test to the corporate defendant); see infra note 118.
116. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839).
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exist only where that statute applied.1 ' The realities of modern corporate par-
ticipation in interstate commerce led the courts to jettison this restrictive view
of personal jurisdiction." 8
3. Venue
In addition to having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the "person,"
the chosen forum must have proper venue. The concept of venue focuses on
the place where the power of a court may be exercised.' 19 The general venue
provision governing actions in the federal courts is 28 U.S.C. § 1391.120 Chap-
ter 87 of title 28 of the United States Code also contains several specific venue
provisions, including section 1400(b), which governs venue in patent infringe-
ment actions. 2' While the trend has been to expand proper venue under the
general venue provision,' the patent venue provision has remained largely
unchanged since its enactment.' 23
a. Requirements of the federal venue statutes
The federal venue provisions are contained in chapter 87 of title 28 of the
United States Code.' 24 The general venue requirements for actions in the fed-
eral courts are stated in section 1391.11 Section 1391(a) governs actions
where jurisdiction is founded on diversity, and allows suit to be brought
"where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. "126
Venue under federal question jurisdiction, governed by section 1391 (b), is sim-
ilar to section 1391(a) except that the plaintiff's residence is excluded.'27 A
117. See id. (limiting the legal existence of a corporation to the sovereignty by which that
corporation is created). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 32, § 1066 (2d ed.
1987) (corporation only subject to suit in the state of its incorporation in connection with any
cause of action inasmuch as it always is present there for purposes of service of process).
118. See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963) (reasoning that revised
notions of jurisdiction over corporations were necessary because the increased use of the corporate
form, and the greater mobility which modern transportation allowed, caused an expansion in cor-
porate activity in interstate commerce).
119. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988); see infra text accompanying note 246 for the language of
amended § 1391(c).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988) provides: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business."
122. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 146, 186-87 and accompanying text.
124. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1412 (1988).
125. Id. § 1391.
126. Id. § 1391(a).
127. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1988) ("A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.") with 28 U.S.C. §
1391(a) (1988) ("A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plain-
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corporation's residence, for purposes of venue under either diversity or federal
question jurisdiction, is defined in section 1391(c). Prior to the passage of the
Amendment, section 1391(c) defined a corporation's residence as "any judicial
district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing busi-
ness." 12" Finally, section 1391(d) provides that an alien may be sued in any
district."'
The focus of these general venue provisions is on the place where an action
may properly be brought.' The purpose of these venue provisions is to protect
the defendant against the risk that the plaintiff will select an unfair or incon-
venient forum.13'
Patent infringement actions are subject to a special venue statute. Title 28,
section 1400(b) of the United States Code provides that "[any civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defend-
ant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business. ' 32
The two clauses of section 1400(b) set out different standards for the estab-
lishment of proper venue. The first clause of section 1400(b) establishes that
proper venue for patent cases exists in the district where the defendant re-
sides.' This is demonstrated in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products
Corp.,' " where the Supreme Court held that a corporate defendant resides
only in the state in which it is incorporated. 3 5 Proper venue under the second
clause, however, is less clear. The second clause applies in patent infringement
cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation and the forum is not its
state of incorporation. 6 There are two requirements for proper venue under
the second clause. The defendant must have a regular and established place of
business in the forum, and the defendant must have committed acts of in-
fringement there. 37
tiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.").
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) (language from the old version of § 1391(c), amended by 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1988).
130. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 32, § 1063, at 224 (2d ed. 1987)
(distinguishing venue from jurisdiction in that "the principles of federal venue have been designed
to insure that litigation is lodged in a convenient forum and to protect defendant against the
possibility that plaintiff will select an arbitrary place in which to bring suit").
131. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) ("In most instances, the
purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff
will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial." (emphasis in original)); see Denver &
R.G.W.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560 (1967) (venue looks to "con-
venience of the litigants and witnesses").
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
133. Id.
134. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
135. Id. at 226.
136. See Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706 (1972) (excluding alien de-
fendants from the restrictions on venue found in § 1400(b)).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
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Courts have taken two approaches to the "regular and established place of
business" requirement. The majority view is that, in order to meet this re-
quirement, the defendant must maintain, control, and pay for a permanent
physical location within the forum district, and conduct business from that
location. 138 The minority view, however, holds that the requirement is satisfied
if the defendant merely does business in the forum district and establishes a
substantial, continuous and systematic presence there.' 39 The Federal Circuit
addressed the issue in dicta in the case of In re Cordis Corp.,"' and seemed to
adopt the minority position. 4'
Similarly, courts have taken two different approaches under the "acts of
infringement" requirement. The Federal Circuit, however, has not adopted ei-
ther approach for this requirement. A line of cases from the Seventh Circuit
asserts that the "acts of infringement" requirement is satisfied by continuous
sales solicitation activity, coupled with demonstrations of the alleged infring-
ing device in the forum." 2 Other courts construe the statute narrowly and
require the defendant to actually consummate a sale in the forum." 3 The rele-
vant time frame for this analysis is the time at which the cause of action
accrues." 4 The special venue provision of section 1400(b) is narrow in scope.
Rather than applying to all patent actions, its application is limited to only
civil actions for patent infringement." 5
138. Dual Mfg. & Eng'g., Inc. v. Burris Indus., 531 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1976); American
Cyanamid v. NOPCO, 388 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968); University of
Illinois Found. v. Channel Master Corp., 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967).
139. Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Shelter-Lite,
Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
140. 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985).
141. Id. at 737. The pertinent language from the Federal Circuit's opinion stated: "[Tihe ap-
propriate inquiry is whether the corporate defendant does its business in that district through a
permanent and continuous presence there and not ... whether it has a fixed physical presence in
the sense of a formal office or store." Id.
142. See, e.g., Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 328 F.2d 949 (7th Cir.
1965) (the defendant's demonstration of the operation of the alleged infringed device on two occa-
sions, coupled with continuous solicitation of orders, was a sufficient degree of selling for venue
purposes); William Sklaroff Design Assocs. v. Metcor Mfg., 224 U.S.P.Q. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(the continuous solicitation of orders, coupled with the physical presence of the product within the
district, was a sufficient degree of selling for venue purposes).
143. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 971 (D. Md. 1985) (The court
based its holding on the idea that the patent venue statute is specific and unambiguous, and
should not be liberally construed.); see also W.S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 236 U.S.
723 (1915) (adopting Lhe narrow construction). The Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme
Court's language in W.S. Tyler was dicta. See Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 328 F.2d at 951.
144. See Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd in rele-
vant part, 776 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the alleged infringer cannot avoid proper venue by
closing its forum location once it becomes aware that it may be subject to a suit for infringement
there).
145. Actions thus excludable from coverage under § 1400(b) include actions for a declaratory
judgment that defendant's patent is invalid or noninfringed, actions to enjoin threatened infringe-
ment, actions against the Commissioner of Patents, and actions against alien defendants. See IA
(pt. 2) J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL, J. WICKER & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
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b. History of the federal venue statutes
The recent amendment to section 1391(c) directly affects the application of
section 1400(b) because it changed the definition of residence for venue pur-
poses. Before analyzing the impact of the Amendment on the operation of
section 1400(b), the balance of this Section outlines the federal venue
structure.
(1) Early venue statutes: plaintiffs allowed broad choice of forums
The first venue statute specifically directed at patent actions146 was appar-
ently enacted to resolve a conflict among the courts on whether the venue pro-
visions of the Act of March 3, 1887,'14 applied to patent infringement cases,
or whether such actions were governed by the Judiciary Act of 1789.148 This
first patent venue statute, enacted in 1897, is the same as the present section
1400(b), except for minor word changes.'
The modern venue statutes evolved from an ancient common law concept. 5
It was not until 1887, however, that the federal courts had any significant
TICE 0.344[9] at 4241-44 (2d ed. 1990); see also 15 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6,
§ 3823, at 214 (2d ed. 1986) ("[I]n many circumstances it is possible to avoid [the exclusive
federal jurisdiction] rule by pleading in a manner that will convert what is in reality a patent
infringement action into a suit about a contract on a patent.").
146. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, providing, in pertinent part:
[tIn suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the circuit courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction . . . in the district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant, or any other district in which the defendant, whether a person, partner-
ship, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular
and established place of business.
Id.
147. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, amended by Act of Aug. 3, 1888, ch. 866, 25
Stat. 433 (the amendment did not substantively alter the 1887 Act).
148. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, I Stat. 78. Supreme Court dicta has raised the possibility
that the restrictions of the 1887 statute did not reach patent cases:
[W]e are of the opinion that the provision of the existing statute, which prohibits suit
to be brought against any person "in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant," is inapplicable to an alien or a foreign corporation sued here, and espe-
cially in a suit for the infringement of a patent right; and that, consequently, such
person or corporation may be sued by a citizen of a state of the Union in any district
in which valid service can be made upon the defendant.
In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893) (suit against an alien (German) corporation); see also In
re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221, 230 (1895) (extending this interpretation of the 1887
statute to encompass domestic corporations).
149. See General Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1961) (finding that
decisions under the 1897 venue statute are authority today because the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the present patent venue statute remained unchanged in substance, although there was
a change in the wording); compare supra note 146 (providing the text of the 1897 provision) with
supra text accompanying note 132 (providing the text of section 1400(b)).
150. See Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. I (1949) (tracing the histori-
cal development of venue).
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statutory venue requirements, as such, for civil actions.1 51 Until that time, the
Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted civil suits, including patent infringement ac-
tions, in any district where the defendant was "an inhabitant, or in which he
[was] found ... " 2 Under the "where found" requirement, venue was proper
if the defendant could be served with process in that district, even if the de-
fendant was only temporarily within the district.153 While the courts tried to
limit the general permissiveness of the Judiciary Act of 1789, plaintiffs were
afforded a rather extensive choice of forums. 54
(2) The Act of March 3, 1887: narrowed access to the federal courts
Plaintiffs abused the expansive venue provision which allowed suit wherever
the defendant could be found.' 55 Defendants in such actions, particularly de-
fendants in suits for patent infringement, often objected to the "injustice and
oppression" which resulted from being forced to defend a suit in a district in
which they were present only by chance. 56 These abuses prompted Congress
to pass the Act of March 3, 1887.7' The 1887 legislation replaced the earlier
venue provision, suggesting a trend to narrow access to the federal courts. The
new provision required a plaintiff to file suit in the district where the defend-
ant was an "inhabitant."'" 8 This provision provided an exception in diversity
cases, however, allowing the plaintiff to bring suit where either the plaintiff or
the defendant resided.
59
(3) The recent trend to expand venue
From 1887 to 1966, no substantial changes were made to the general venue
provisions. The Judicial Code of 1948160 made alterations in the language of
the statute, largely to conform to judicial constructions of the former stat-
ute. "' This code also added the requirements for proper-venue with respect to
151. See 15 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3802 (2d ed. 1986).
152. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, I Stat. 78; see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 (pt. 3) Stat.
470 (retaining the provision allowing suit wherever the defendant could be found).
153. See 15 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3802 (2d ed. 1986).
154. See Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 U.S. 208, 216 (1857) (patent infringement action).
155. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942); Bowers v. Atlantic, G.
& P. Co., 104 F. 887, 889 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900).
156. Bowers, 104 F. at 889 (noting that in no branch of federal jurisdiction were complaints of
injustice and oppression more numerous than in infringement suits).
157. See Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563; Bowers, 104 F. at 889. But see In re Keasbey & Mattison
Co., 160 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1893) (stating in dicta that the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1887
did not apply to suits for patent infringement).
158. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552.
159. Id. This Act gave rise to the anomaly, which still exists today, that a wider choice of venue
is provided in diversity cases than in federal question cases (plaintiff's residence being a choice
only in diversity cases). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988).
160. Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (codified at 28 U.S.C.).
161. See 15 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3802 (2d ed. 1986).
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corporations 62 and aliens.' 63 Section 1391(c) provided that a "corporation
may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to
do business or is doing business .... "164 The district where the business is
incorporated, licensed, or actively doing business, serves as the corporation's
residence for venue purposes.165 In 1966, Congress added the district "in
which the claim arose" as an alternative venue in diversity cases and federal
question cases.'
66
(4) The history of the special venue statute for patent infringement actions
In 1895, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the general venue provisions
of the 1887 Act, which restricted venue over an alleged corporate infringer to
the state of incorporation, did not apply to patent infringement actions.'67
Rather, the Court held in In re Keasbey & Mattison Co. " that the broader
venue of the "where found" provision from the Judiciary Act of 1789 still
controlled. 69 In response to the Keasbey decision, Congress enacted the Patent
Venue Act of 1897. This act provided that patent infringement suits may be
brought "in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any
district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation,
shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established
place of business."' 70
The intent of Congress in passing the Patent Venue Act was to narrow the
broad "where found" venue delineated by Keasbey.'7 ' This intent is evident
from both the timing of the passage of the Patent Venue Act and Congres-
sional debate on the subject. 72 The timing of Congressional passage of the
patent venue statute, less then two years after the Keasbey decision, demon-
strates the Legislature's dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's ruling.' 3
Congressional debate on the Patent Venue Act of 1897, as reported from the
House Committee on Patents, supports the view that it was intended to restrict
venue in patent infringement cases. 74 The Committee report stated, "[t]his
162. Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, § 1391(c), 62 Stat. 869, 935 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (c)).
163. Id. § 1391(d) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d)).
164. Id. § 1391(c).
165. Id.
166. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, § 1, 80 Stat. 1111.
167. In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221, 224-25 (1895).
168. 160 U.S. 221 (1895)
169. Id. at 224-25; accord In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893).
170. Patent Venue Act of 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
171. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
1897 legislation).
173. 29 CONG. REC. 1901 (1897). Congressman Mitchell made of record the list of conflicting
decisions collected by the Committee on Patents, segregated by circuit, and explained as to hold-
ing. Id. These decisions referred to the Supreme Court decisions of Hohorst and Keasbey. Id.
174. H.R. REP. No. 2805, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897).
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bill seeks to define the jurisdiction of the courts in patent suits .. ".. ,1'5 Later
in the same floor debate on the bill, Congressman Lacey, the bill's author,
stated:
The main purpose of the bill is to give original jurisdiction to the court
where a permanent agency transacting the business is located, and that busi-
ness is engaged in the infringement of the patent rights . . . . Isolated cases
of infringement would not confer this jurisdiction, but only where a perma-
nent agency is established.'76
In discussing this legislation, Congress 'used restrictive language and the pre-
sent tense, indicating a change in the law.1 77
Several cases decided soon after the Act of 1897 suggest that interpreting
that act as limiting venue in patent infringement cases is correct. 7 8 One of the
decisions in this era was Bowers v. Atlantic G. & P. Co.'79 Bowers was a
patent infringement case filed in New York against a West Virginia corpora-
tion. The West Virginia corporation had an established place of business in
New York.'80 The plaintiff, however, only alleged infringing acts in Geor-
gia. 81 In the course of considering the plaintiffs argument that the Act of
1897 enlarged proper venue, 8 ' the court concluded that the Patent Venue Act
of 1887 clearly restricted venue vis-a-vis the Act of 1789.188 The Bowers court
gave four reasons for its holding that the Patent Venue Act of 1897 did not
broaden patent venue: (1) venue was as broad as the limits of the United
States and did not need to be broadened; (2) there was no demand for broad-
ening; (3) legislative intent, with respect to the passage of the 1887 venue
legislation, revealed that Congress favored restricted venue, and as long as the
courts applied the restricted venue to patent infringement actions, Congress
remained silent; and (4) the 1897 Act was Congress' reply to Keasbey, re-
jecting Keasbey's broader venue.' 8 '
The 1897 Act provided greater protection to defendants in patent infringe-
ment actions than the Judiciary Act of 1789, although it afforded less protec-
tion than the Act of March 3, 1887.185 Today, the patent venue statute' 86
175. 29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See Bowers v. Atlantic G. & P. Co., 104 F. 887 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900).
179. Id. (thoroughly discussing patent venue in the period from 1887 to 1897 and the intent of
Congress when it passed the 1897 Act).
180. Id. at 888.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 889.
183. Id. at 890.
184. Id. at 890-91 (noting that "[this] court is unable to discover anything in the circumstances
leading up to the passage of this act to aid the contention of the complainants that it broadened
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in patent causes"). The court erroneously referred to venue as
jurisdiction. See id.
185. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier general venue
provisions).
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remains substantially unchanged from the Act of 1897.87
B. Application of the Venue Statutes in the Federal Courts
The patent venue statute, section 1400(b), affords greater protection to cor-
porate defendants in patent infringement suits than the general venue provi-
sion, section 1391, provides.18 Under the current Supreme Court venue doc-
trine, section 1400(b) is the "sole and exclusive" provision controlling venue in
patent infringement actions." 9 It is not to be supplemented by the provisions
of the general corporate venue statute in section 1391(c).190
1. The Stonite and Fourco Cases Lay the Groundwork
A line of Supreme Court cases asserts that the patent venue statute is exclu-
sive in patent infringement cases and may not be supplemented by general
venue provisions. 9' The first of these cases was Stonite Products Co. v. Mel-
vin Lloyd Co.'92 In Stonite, the corporate defendant, Stonite Products Com-
pany, was an inhabitant of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and had no
regular and established place of business in the Western District of Pennsylva-
nia.' 93 Co-defendant, Lowe Supply Company, was an inhabitant of the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania."9 The plaintiff, Melvin Lloyd Company, sued
both defendants in the Western District of Pennsylvania for patent
infringement.' 95
Since venue was improper as to Stonite in the Western District under the
patent venue statute, the issue was whether the patent venue statute could be
supplemented by what is now section 1392(a).' 96 Section 1392(a) provides
that a transitory civil action against multiple defendants, who reside in differ-
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988).
187. See supra note 146 (presenting the text of the patent venue provision of 1897).
188. See supra notes 156-84 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow requirements of the
patent venue statute; that is, a corporate defendant may only be sued in its state of incorporation,
or where it has a regular and established place of business and committed acts of infringement);
see also Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 681 F. Supp. 959 (D. Mass. 1987) (finding that the § 1400(b)
'regular and established place of business" standard requires more than the minimum contacts
necessary to establish personal jurisdiction, and more than the 1391(c) "doing business" stan-
dard); OMI Int'l Corp. v. MacDermid, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1012 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (finding that
more contacts are required to satisfy the § 1400(b) "regular and established place of business"
standard than are necessary under the "doing business" standard of § 1391(c)).
189. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1957). Thus, a cor-
poration cannot be sued for patent infringement in a district in which it is simply "doing business"
without committing acts of infringement there. Id.; see infra notes 192-236 and accompanying
text.
190. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 227-29.
191. Id.; Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
192. 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
193. Id. at 562-63.
194. Id. at 563.
195. Id.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1988).
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ent districts in the same state, may be brought in any such district."9 7 The
Stonite Court held that the plaintiff could not rely on the predecessor of sec-
tion 1392(a), and that the patent venue statute alone controlled this action. l98
A few years after Stonite, Congress enacted section 1391(c) in the Judicial
Code of 1948.'9 Section 1391(c) provided that "for venue purposes," a corpo-
ration is deemed to reside where "it is incorporated or licensed to do business
or is doing business . ".. 200 Prior to this enactment, a corporation was
deemed to reside, for venue purposes, only where it was incorporated."'
Despite the explicit additions to the definition of corporate residence by the
Judicial Code of 1948, the Supreme Court refused to view this code as a sub-
stantive change to the patent venue statute.0 2 In Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans-
mirra Products Corp.,20 3 the plaintiff argued that the new liberalized general
venue provision laid out in section 1391(c) should be read as a supplement to
the patent venue statute.2 " In Fourco, Transmirra Products Corporation sued
Fourco Glass Company, a West Virginia corporation, for patent infringement
in the Southern District of New York." 5 Fourco maintained a regularly estab-
lished place of business in that district, but there was no showing that it had
committed any acts of infringement there. 0 6 The Fourco Court found that
there was no legislative intent in the passage of the 1948 revision of the Judi-
cial Code to substantively change the patent venue statute, and thus, the stat-
ute was not to be supplemented by section 1391(c), the general corporate
venue statute.207 The Court held that for purposes of venue under the patent
venue statute, a corporation resides only in the state of its incorporation.' 0
197. Id.
198. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567 (1942).
199. See supra notes 160 & 164 and accompanying text.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982).
201. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Const. Co.', 333 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1948). The same rule applied to
suits for patent infringement. E.g., Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
202. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 228.
205. Id. at 223.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 227-29.
208. Id. Commentators have criticized the Fourco decision based primarily on what is con-
tended to be an erroneous reading of the legislative history of the patent venue statute. See Ger-
iak, Fifteen Years of Fourco-The Needless Disputes Over Patent Venue, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 55,
57 (1972) ("It would seem rather remarkable to a person untrained in the law that the Supreme
Court could interpret the word "resides" in section 1400(b) ...differently from the manner
prescribed in section 1391(c) .... It is scarcely less remarkable to a lawyer that the Court was
able to do just that in Fourco."); Wydick, Venue in Patent Actions, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 559
(1973) ("A reexamination of the legislative history of the patent venue statute would have shown
that this result was probably not in accord with Congressional intent."); Recent Cases, II VAND.
L. REV. 228 (1957). See generally IA (pt. 2) J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL, J. WICKER &
B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 0.344[9], at 4247-51 (2d ed. 1990) (reviser's note to §
1391 does not indicate that any change in the general venue statute was intended); 15 WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 3823, at 217-19 (2d ed. 1986) (both the reasoning and the
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Thus, after Fourco, it seemed the patent venue statute remained unchanged in
its definition of a corporation's residence.
2. The Brunette and Pure Oil Cases Refine the Scope of Fourco
Recent Supreme Court decisions, although not entirely consistent, have
tended to limit the Fourco holding. In Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v.
Kockum Industries, Inc.,2 the Court limited its restrictive interpretation of
the patent venue statute.210 In a unanimous decision, the Brunette Court held
that section 1391(d), providing that an alien may be sued in any district,
rather than section 1400(b), applied to the issue of venue in a patent infringe-
ment action against an alien corporation. " Kockum Industries, Inc., filed a
patent infringement suit against Brunette Machine Works, Ltd., a Canadian
corporation, in the District of Oregon.21 2 Brunette had no regular place of
business in Oregon.2 18 Kockum obtained service of process on Brunette in Ore-
gon under that state's long-arm statute.21 The district court applied section
1400(b) as the exclusive venue provision in patent infringement actions and
dismissed the complaint for improper venue because Brunette was a Canadian
corporation and had no regular place of business in Oregon. 1 5 The Supreme
Court, disagreeing with this construction of the venue statutes,2"6 held that
section 1391(d) was applicable in a patent infringement suit against an alien
defendant.217 The Court distinguished Fourco and Stonite on the grounds that
the plaintiffs in those cases sought to supplement section 1400(b) with a gen-
eral venue provision, while in Brunette plaintiffs sought to supplement section
1400(b) with section 1391(d), which the Court found to be a specific
provision.218
Brunette did not overrule Fourco or Stonite; the Court agreed that the pat-
ent venue provision was not to be supplemented by the general venue provi-
result in Fourco are highly debatable). But see Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) Should Not Be Repealed, 4 APLA Q.J. 32, 47-48 (1976); Note, Patents-Venue in In-
fringement Suits-Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) and § 1400 (b), 26 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
117 (1957). These commentators argue that the patent venue provision of the 1897 statute was
less restrictive than the general venue provision which was then applicable to claims arising under
federal law. All that is clear from these arguments and the related case law is that the legislative
history of the original patent venue statute is ambiguous.
209. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
210. Id. at 710. •
211. Id. However, the Court also concluded that "it is fair to say, as the Court did in Stonite
and Fourco, that in 1897 Congress placed patent infringement cases by themselves, outside the
scope of the general venue legislation." Id. at 713.
212. Id. at 707.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 714.
218. Id. at 713.
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sions."I The rationale of the Court in Brunette was simply that section
1391(d) was not a venue restriction at all, but rather a declaration of the
policy that an alien should not be able to avoid suit on such procedural
grounds.22 0
The Supreme Court has also considered the effect of section 1391 on special
venue provisions found outside title 28. In Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez,22" ' the Court
found that the definition of corporate residence in section 1391(c) should ap-
ply to most special venue statutes that speak in terms of residence, in the
absence of contrary indications in the special provisions.22 The Pure Oil Court
held that the general venue provisions of section 1391(c) were to supplement
the special venue provision of the Jones Act.22 In Pure Oil, the plaintiff,
Suarez, brought his action under the Jones Act in the Southern District of
Florida where the defendant, Pure Oil, was neither incorporated nor had its
principal office. 22' While Pure Oil argued that venue in that district was im-
proper under the literal language of the Jones Act's venue provi'sion, 2 5 Suarez
argued that the general venue statute, section 1391(c), supplemented the spe-
cial venue provision of the Jones Act. 28 The Supreme Court agreed with
Suarez. The Court distinguished Fourco on the grounds that the Court in
Fourco was "merely following the purpose and letter of the original enactment
[of the patent venue statute]," and "the patent venue section at issue in
Fourco was itself revised in 1948, in the same Act that contained section
1391(c).1221 7 Thus, while recent decisions of the Supreme Court have refined
the restrictive reading of section 1400(b), the Court remains unwilling to ap-
219. Id. at 710.
220. Id. at 714. The Court stated that § 1391(d) was a declaration of "the long-established rule
that suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of the federal venue laws." Id. In dicta,
Justice Marshall's opinion for the unanimous Court explicitly noted that the 1897 patent venue
statute "was rather less restrictive than the general venue provision then applicable. ... Id. at
712. This contradicts the Fourco analysis of the legislative history of the patent venue statute. See
supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
221. 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
222. Id. at 205. The Court distinguished Fourco on the ground that the patent venue statute
was enacted in 1897 "specifically to narrow venue in such suits." Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 204. The purpose of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), is to provide substan-
tive rights to seamen and a federal forum in which to vindicate those rights. Id. at 205. Suarez, a
seaman employed by petitioners, filed suit in negligence under the Jones Act for personal injuries
allegedly suffered in the course of his employment. Id. at 202. The following "minor provision,"
id. at 207, governs proper venue under the Jones Act: "Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under
the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). Despite the language of jurisdiction in the provision, it refers
only to venue. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1924).
224. Pure Oil, 384 U.S. at 202 (Pure Oil moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of
Illinois on the ground that venue was improper in Florida).
225. See supra note 223 (presenting the text of the special venue provision contained in the
Jones Act).
226. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 202-04 (1966).
227. Id. at 206. The Court found that, in the case of the Jones Act venue provision, Congress
intended to expand the plaintiff's choice of venue. Id. at 207.
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ply section 1391(c) to supplement this section.22a
3. Fourco in the Federal Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed the
Fourco holding that section 1400(b) may not be supplemented by section
1391(c).2"' In In re Cordis Corp.,230 a patent infringement action, the plain-
tiff, a Minnesota corporation, filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota. 3 ' Cordis Corporation, the defendant, was a Florida
corporation with its principal place of business in Miami. 32 The Cordis court
stated that venue in patent infringement actions is controlled exclusively by
section 1400(b). 33 In addition, the court held that for purposes of the first
clause of section 1400(b), a corporation is a resident only of the state in which
it is incorporated.2 34 Thus, despite its contacts with the Minnesota district,235
228. E.g., Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum-Indus., 406 U.S. 706 (1972); Schnell v. Peter
Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1961) (holding that the defendant could not be held to waive
the patent venue requirements because this would allow venue outside § 1400(b) which is the sole
and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions); see also In re Cordis
Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985); Self v. Fisher Controls Co.,
566 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1977); Amba Mktg. Sys. v. Jobar Int'l, 551 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1977); Dual
Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., 531 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1976); Illinois Scientific Dev., Inc. v.
Sirica, 410 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1968); T.P. Laboratories v. Ormco Corp., 389 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1968); American Cyanamid Co. v. NOPCO Chem. Co., 388 F.2d 818, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906
(4th Cir. 1968); Holub Indus. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1961); Blaski v. Hoffman, 260
F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Medical Designs v. Orthopedic Tech., 684
F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Tex. 1988); San Shoe Trading Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 341
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); OMNI Int'l Corp. v. MacDermid, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1012 (M.D.N.C. 1986);
California Irrigation Serv. v. Barton Corp., 654 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1985); Network Sys. Corp.
v. Masstor Sys. Corp., 612 F. Supp. 438 (D. Minn. 1984); Cabot Corp. v. WGM Safety Corp.,
562 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mass. 1983); Dicar, Inc. v. L.E. Sauer Mach. Co., 530 F. Supp. 1083
(D.N.J. 1982); Choat v. Rome Indus., 467 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Mass. 1978); Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 420 F. Supp. 277 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc.,
400 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mass. 1975) (all refusing to supplement § 1400(b) with the general provi-
sions of section 1391(c)).
229. See In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 734.
232. Id. The plaintiff sued in Minnesota based on Cordis' sales of implantable heart pacers
there. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 735 (citing Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Co., 353 U.S. 222 (1957)).
235. Cordis employed two full-time sales representatives in Minnesota who maintained offices
in their homes and kept an inventory of Cordis products there. Id. at 735. Both were paid a salary
plus commission and they worked exclusively for Cordis, which supplied them each with a com-
pany-owned car. Id. Cordis was not registered to do business in Minnesota, did not have a bank
account there, and neither owned nor leased any property within the state. Id. Cordis engaged a
secretarial service in Minnesota, and the business cards of the salesmen listed that number. Id.
The Minneapolis telephone directory included Cordis's name and telephone number and listed the
secretarial service's address as Cordis's address. Id.
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the court found that Cordis "resided" only in the state of Florida. 6
With this backdrop of the law of federal venue, this Note now focuses on
the proper interpretation of the scope of the amendment to section 1391(c)
with respect to patent venue. A brief discussion of principles of statutory con-
struction will aid in this analysis of the Amendment.
C. Principles of Statutory Construction
Judicial analysis of a legislative enactment begins with a close reading of
the language of the statute."' When the language of the statute is unambigu-
ous, the court should enforce the statute according to its literal terms.239 This
principle is commonly known as the plain meaning rule.23 9 Under this rule, a
court may not refer to other indications of legislative intent or meaning when
the literal terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous.240
On the other hand, when the literal terms of a statute are ambiguous, the
court may examine its relationship with other statutes within the same
scheme241 and legislative history242 for indicia of intent or meaning. Courts use
two fundamental rules of construction to interpret a statute in the context of a
statutory scheme: (1) grant specific provisions priority over conflicting general
provisions; 4 and (2) give effect to every phrase and sentence of a statute
236. Id. at 735. The court went on to hold that there was a rational and substantial basis for
finding the Minnesota district was a proper venue as to Cordis under the second clause in §
1400(b). Id. at 736-37. A proper venue under the second clause of § 1400(b) is any district where
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)).
Much of the litigation involving § 1400(b) concerns the "regular and established place of busi-
ness" standard. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text. Specifically, the courts have split
on whether the statute requires a specific permanent physical location there, or whether it simply
requires a permanent and continuous presence there. See, e.g., Phillips v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752
(9th Cir. 1941) (requiring permanent physical location).
In addition, under the "acts of infringement" requirement, the courts look to the acts specified
in 35 U.S.C. § 271 and do not reach the merits of the infringement issue. See Cordis, 769 F.2d at
737 (citing Gunter & Cooke, Inc. v. Southern Elec. Serv. Co., 256 F. Supp. 639, 648 (M.D.N.C.
1966), affd, 378 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1967)).
237. See 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§
46.01-48.20 (4th ed. 1984).
238. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 471 (1917); see also McBarron v. S&T Indus.,
771 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that courts initially look to the plain meaning of the
statute to determine the intended meaning of the legislation) (citing 2A N. SINGER, supra note
237, § 46.01).
239. See, e.g., Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943).
240. 2A N. SINGER, supra note 237, § 46.04. But see id. § 46.07 (contrary to the traditional
operation of the plain meaning rule, the trend has been to consider other indicia of intent from the
start rather than beginning the inquiry by considering only the language of the act); see also
United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (stating that the plain meaning of the
legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which literal application of the statute
will produce results demonstrably, at odds with the intention of its drafters).
241. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 237, § 47.01-.38.
242. See id. § 48.01-.20.
243. See id. § 51.05 (noting that general and special acts dealing with the same subject should
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where possible.2 4 4 These rules are rules of construction and not rules of law
and, therefore, serve merely as guidelines for courts faced with ambiguous
statutes.
II. AMENDMENT OF 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
Congress recently amended section 1391(c), the governing provision for
venue in actions against corporations, by passing the Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act.2 5 Section 1391(c) now provides:
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a state which
has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corpo-
ration is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced,
such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that state
within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal juris-
diction if that district were a separate state, and, if there is no such district,
the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has
the most significant contacts. 2"
Prior to the amendment, section 1391(c) provided: "A corporation may be
sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do busi-
ness or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the
residence of such corporation for venue purposes. 24 7 The Act, which became
effective February 16, 1989, makes the test for corporate residency the same
as that used for determining when personal jurisdiction exists over a defend-
ant, that is, the "minimum contacts" test.248 More importantly, a literal read-
ing of amended section 1391(c) would extend its definition of corporate resi-
dency to the special venue provisions within chapter 87 of title 28 of the
United States Code.24 One such provision is section 1400(b), the patent venue
provision under which corporations have been held to reside only where they
were incorporated.250 Thus, the literal language of the Act is in direct conflict
be construed together, except, where there is any conflict, the latter wil prevail regardless of
whether it was passed prior to the general statute, unless it appears that the legislature intended to
make the general act controlling).
244. See id. § 46.06; see also CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (citing Fourco as a "far more careful and thoughtful approach to interpretation than
wooden citation to a canon of construction," and finding that "the Supreme Court has clearly
expressed its distrust of phraseology born of the revision-codification process in situations where
the new language, if taken literally, would demonstrably conflict with settled precedent or policy,
or significantly impede the operation of other, pre-existing statutes").
245. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (1982)).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
248. See supra notes 32-118 and accompanying text (discussion of "minimum contacts" test).
249. See supra text accompanying note 246 for text of § 1391(c).
250. See supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
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with the case law regarding the application of the special patent venue provi-
sion251 The meaning of amended section 1391(c) is ambiguous, however, when
read in light of judicial interpretation of the language of the prior version.2 5 2
To add to this ambiguity, there is no indication in the scarce legislative history
that Congress intended such a drastic change in the law.2 53
Despite extensive legislative history on the Act, an indication of Congres-
sional intent to substantively modify the provisions of section 1400(b) is lack-
ing."" To the contrary, "[a] stated aim of Congress was to restrict the plain-
tiff's venue choices somewhat .... .
The prior section 1391(c) provided that venue was proper in an action
against a corporate defendant in the corporation's district of incorporation or
in any district in which it was licensed to do business or actually doing busi-
ness. Congress' amendment to 1391(c) was directed at the "incorporated or
licensed to do business" segment of the old statute. A corporation that duly
licenses itself under state law is authorized to do business anywhere in the
state.256 Hence, in a state with several districts, the "licensing" standard would
make any district in that state a proper venue in an action against a corporate
defendant. 25 7 It was this venue choice which Congress sought to eliminate with
the second sentence of the new section 1391(c): 2 58
The general venue statute defines the residence of a corporation as "any
judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is
doing business." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Read literally, the statute appears to
make venue proper in any district in a multidistrict state ....
The Judicial Conference proposes that a corporation for venue purposes
251. The amended § 1391(c) is not, however, literally different than the older version which
militates against an intended change in meaning. See supra text accompanying notes 246-47
(presenting the language used in both provisions).
252. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 291-300 and accompanying text.
254. The district courts that have addressed the issue have noted the dearth of legislative his-
tory demonstrating congressional intent to modify section 1400(b). E.g., Century Wrecker Corp.
v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), appeal granted, 902 F.2d 43
(Fed. Cir. 1990). "The blanket applicability of section 139 1(c) was not addressed on the floor of
Congress when the amendments [to that section] were passed, nor was it mentioned in the House
Judiciary Committee Report." 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 974, at 425
(Mar. 29, 1990). "Although the proposal developed within the Judicial Conference of the United
States, this issue is also not addressed in the Report of the 1987 Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference, in the Report of the Committee on Court Administration to the Judicial Conference,
or in the report of the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction to the Committee on Court Adminis-
tration." Id. at 425-26.
255. Siegal, Commentary on the 1988 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391, at 3 (Supp. 1990).
256. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 165 (2d ed. 1970); Siegal, supra note 255, at 3.
257. Siegal, supra note 255, at 3; see also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308
U.S. 165 (1939) (discussing venue in a multidistrict state); supra note 255 and accompanying
text.
258. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (report of Representative Kastenmeier
on behalf of the House Judiciary Committee), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5982, 6031.
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should be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction . . ..1
In addition, the legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the
amendment to section 1391 to be minor and merely technical. 260 Finally, the
proposal to amend section 1391(c)' 61 clearly stated that the proposal had a
very narrow purpose and was not intended to overrule any special venue stat-
ute."2 Thus, the only intent evident in the legislative history of the new section
1391(c) is to restrict venue in multidistrict states where a corporation's "con-
tacts" with a district are not sufficient to allow personal jurisdiction over the
corporation in that district.
III. ANALYSIS
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 268 significantly
changed the status of corporations under the federal venue provisions. Previ-
ously, a corporation's "residence," for purposes of venue, in a patent infringe-
ment suit was defined by its place of incorporation. 2 4 Now, section 1391(c)
defines corporate "residence," for purposes of venue, as any place where per-
sonal jurisdiction exists over the corporate defendant.26
In effect, this amendment creates two changes to the federal venue struc-
ture. First, the amended version of section 1391(c) makes the test for corpo-
rate residency the same as that used for determining when personal jurisdic-
259. S. Res. 1013, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S16,307 (1988) (citation omitted).
260. Id. at S16,304 ("Title X [of Senate Bill 1482, which includes the amendment of section
1391(c)] consists of twenty-three miscellaneous provisions dealing with relatively minor proposals
to improve some aspect of the Federal Judiciary.")
261. The proposal originated in a 1985 memorandum written by Judge William W. Schwarzer
to the members of the Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Court Administration. See 39 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 974, at 426 (Mar. 29, 1990). Judge Schwarzer is
quoted as writing:
It is not clear how far Section 1391(c) defines corporate residence for purposes of
special venue statutes. The statute could be clarified by stating that it applies for
purposes of determining venue under any statute.
A separate question is whether Section 1391 could be read as limiting venue in
actions by or against corporations under other special statutes or rules. It may be
useful to attempt to clarify this question.
Id. (emphasis in original).
262. Id. _
263. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c) (1982)).
264. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); see also supra
notes 135, 155-66 and accompanying text (discussing corporate residence in patent infringement
cases); supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing the second clause of § 1400(b)
which allows suit in the district where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has
a regular and established place of business).
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988); see also supra notes 32-118 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the minimum contacts requirement).
PATENT VENUE
tion exists over a defendant. 66 Second, a literal reading of amended section
1391(c) 267 extends this definition of corporate residency to all of title 28, chap-
ter 87 of the United States Code, including section 1400(b).2 68 Federal courts
are now faced with the task of applying the amended section 1391(c), which
appears to be in direct opposition with the Supreme Court holding in Fourco
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.26 9 As discussed earlier, the Fourco
Court held that section 1400(b) is the "sole and exclusive" provision control-
ling venue in patent infringement actions, and is not to be supplemented by
the provisions of the general corporate venue statute in section 1391(c)."'
This Section of the Note attempts to interpret amended section 1391(c) in
order to determine the Amendment's effect on patent venue requirements.
First, this Section will apply principles of statutory construction to the
Amendment. 7 Next, this Section will look to Congress' intent in amending
section 1391(c), in order to determine its intended effect upon section
1400(b). 272
In interpreting amended section 1391(c), a court is likely to apply first the
plain meaning rule,273 and, if the court finds that the amendment to section
1391(c) is ambiguous, it then applies basic rules of statutory construction as a
means of distilling legislative intent. 74
A. Statutory Construction
1. The Plain Meaning Rule
Application of the plain meaning rule to the amendment of section 1391(c)
indicates that the definition of corporate residence contained therein is to be
applied to all of the venue provisions found in title 28, chapter 87 of the
United States Code. Amended section 1391(c) provides, in pertinent part:
"For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced .... ,,275 The plain
meaning rule dictates that a court must abide by the literal terms of a statute
where those terms are not ambiguous. 76 Amended section 1391(c) is not am-
biguous. Its terms clearly and unambiguously provide that section 1391(c) de-
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) states that the definition of corporate residence therein applies
"[flor purposes of venue under this chapter ...." (emphasis added).
268. 28 U.S.C. ch. 87 includes §§ 1391-1412.
269. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
270. Id. at 229.
271. See infra notes 275-90 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 291-300 and accompanying text.
273. The plain meaning rule compels a court to apply the literal language of a statute where
that language is clear and unambiguous. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
274. Id.
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
276. See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
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fines corporate residence for purposes of venue under chapter 87.277 This chap-
ter includes the patent venue statute. Under the plain meaning rule, therefore,
the amended section 1391(c) provides the definition for the place where a cor-
porate defendant "resides" under the patent venue statute.
The plain meaning rule, however, does not always apply.2 78 In addition to
the situation where the statutory language is ambiguous, the plain meaning
rule should not be applied where the language under consideration is con-
trolled by "other parts of the act or other acts upon the same subject."279 The
corollary to this proposition is equally valid; the plain meaning rule should not
be applied where the language under consideration purports to control other
parts of the act or other acts upon the same subject. In these latter cases, the
court should go beyond applying the plain meaning of the statute to interpret
the language in light of the effect the interpretation has on other provisions
dealing with the same subject matter. In other words, the statute should be
interpreted in the context of the other provisions within the same statutory
scheme. In so doing, the following fundamental rules of construction should
guide the court: first, specific provisions prevail over conflicting general provi-
sions; second, the court should give effect to every part or sentence of a statute
where possible. 280
2. Exceptions to the Plain Meaning Rule
a. Specific provisions prevail over conflicting general provisions
Congress created a specific venue statute for patent infringement actions. 8
Basic principles of statutory construction mandate that a statute dealing with
a narrow, precise, and specific subject not be subsumed by a later enacted
statute covering a more generalized spectrum.282 In applying this rule of con-
struction to section 1400(b), the Fourco Court found that section 1400(b) was
not to be supplemented by the general venue provisions of section 1391(c), a
then new provision enacted in the Judicial Code of 1948.288 Fourco has been
cited as authority for the maxim that the general language of a statute will not
be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same
277. See supra note 268 (chapter 87 includes §§ 1391-1412).
278. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
279. 2A N. SINGER, supra note 237, § 46.01, at 74.
280. See id. § 46.07 (application of these fundamental principles from the beginning of the
court's analysis is consistent with the modern trend in statutory construction).
281. See supra notes 146-87 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the patent venue
statute).
282. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (the more specific venue provi-
sion of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94, was not subject to interpretation in light of the
more recently enacted Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).
283. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); see also Network
Sys. Corp. v. Masstor Sys. Corp., 612 F. Supp 438, 440 (D. Minn. 1984) (finding that Congress
recognized the technical nature of patent litigation and the particular advantage in limiting its
prosecution to forums where the defendant is located).
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enactment, regardless of how inclusive the general language may be.28' A
court applying this rule should presume that a legislature does not intend to
overturn established rules of law, unless an intention to do so plainly appears
by expressed declaration.285 As a result of the absence in amended section
1391(c)2 11 of clear intent to the contrary, this rule dictates that section
1400(b) continue to be the "sole and exclusive" provision controlling venue in
patent infringement actions.
b. Courts should give effect to each part of the statute
A literal reading of amended section 1391(c) would redefine the place where
a corporate defendant "resides" under the first clause of section 1400(b) and
render the second clause of 1400(b) surplusage. This construction of section
1391(c) violates the rule of statutory construction that courts should give ef-
fect to all sections.of a statute.28 7 One section of a statute should not be inter-
preted in a manner which makes another section inoperative or superfluous,
unless the latter section is the result of obvious mistake.288 The second clause
of section 1400(b) provides that venue is proper where the defendant has both
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.288 The literal language of amended section 1391 (c) renders this care-
ful scheme superfluous by establishing a venue scheme which allows defend-
ants to be sued wherever personal jurisdiction is present, regardless of whether
the defendant has committed acts of infringement or has a regular and estab-
lished place of business within that forum. Section 1400(b) resulted not from
the result of an obvious mistake or error, but from a delibeiate Congressional
act intended to limit patent venue.28 ' Contrary to these basic principles, a lit-
eral interpretation of amended section 1391(c) effectively repeals section
1400(b) and thus, under such a reading, eliminates any special venue provision
for corporate defendants in patent infringement actions. The literal language
of section 1391(c) would not allow a court to give effect to section 1400(b).
B. Congressional Intent to Substantively Alter Section 1400(b) Is Lacking
If the courts adopt a plain meaning reading of the amended section 1391 (c),
section 1391(c) will effectively overrule the Fourco line of cases that refused
to allow the definition of corporate residence in section 1391(c) to be read into
section 1400(b).81 This is an anomalous result in that the amendment to sec-
284. See 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 974, at 426 (Mar. 29, 1990).
285. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 181 (1974).
286. See supra text accompanying note 246 (providing the text of amended § 1391(c)).
287. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 237, § 46.06.
288. Id. § 46.01, at 91.
289. See supra text accompanying note 132 (text of section 1400(b)).
290. See supra notes 146-87 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the patent venue
statute).
291. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Co., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957); supra notes
209-36 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of the Fourco holding in the federal
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tion 1391(c) was apparently intended to narrow the scope of proper venue over
corporate defendants.2 92 The literal language, which requires section 1391(c)
to supplement section 1400(b), greatly expands proper venue over corporate
defendants in patent infringement cases. As one commentator noted, "it is
quite clear that the amendment will have the opposite effect, expanding
choices .... ,"293 The amended version of section 1391(c), by its plain terms,
effects a much greater change in the law than is discussed in the legislative
history of the Act.29'
The legislative history of the Act of March 3, 1897, the original patent
venue statute, clearly indicates that Congress was aware of the state of patent
venue law as viewed by the Supreme Court at the time, and that Congress
perceived the need to deal specially with patent venue.295 By contrast, a care-
ful reading of the legislative history of amended section 1391(c) reveals abso-
lutely no intent on the part of Congress to substantively alter the patent venue
statute,2 96 yet the literal language of amended section 1391(c) purports to do
exactly that. It effectively overrules the current state of the patent venue law
as viewed by the Supreme Court and expands proper venue in patent infringe-
ment actions.297
The incongruities among the plain meaning of amended section 1391(c), the
dearth of legislative history on amended section 1391(c), and the settled case
law governing' the effect of section 1391(c) on section 1400(b) suggest that
any substantive change resulting from the literal language of amended section
1391(c) is inadvertent. If Congress intended to overrule Fourco, and to act in
opposition to its previously stated intent under section 1400(b), it should have
addressed these subjects in the legislative history of the Amendment.
Prior to the Amendment, the definition of corporate residence in section
1391(c) was applied "for venue purposes. '298 In Fourco, the Court looked to
the legislative history of section 1391(c) to determine the effect of this lan-
guage on patent venue. The Court found no legislative intent in the enactment
courts).
292. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (discussing the intent of the House
Judiciary Committee to restrict a plaintiff's choice of fora where the corporate defendant is incor-
porated in a multidistrict state); supra text accompanying note 246 (text of amended § 1391(c));
see also HR. REP. No. 899, 100 Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (pt. I on H.R. 4807, "Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act of 1988," Aug. 26, 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 6031; Siegal, supra note 255, at 3 (reflecting only an intent to restrict proper
venue in multidistrict states).
293. Siegal, supra note 255, at 3.
294. See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the original pat-
ent venue statute). The legislative history included a list of conflicting court decisions on patent
venue collected by the Committee on Patents, segregated by circuit and explained as to holding,
and a transcript of the floor debate on the subject of venue in patent infringement cases. 29 CONG.
REC. 1901 (1897) (testimony of Congressman Mitchell).
296. See supra notes 254-62 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 189-228 and accompanying text.
298. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 247.
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of section 1391(c) to substantively alter the patent venue statute, and there-
fore, held that section 1400(b) was not to be supplemented by section
1391(c). 211 Following the reasoning of the Fourco Court, since there is nothing
in the legislative history of the Amendment indicating congressional intent to
substantively alter the patent venue statute,30 0 courts should not read the lan-
guage literally, and section 1400(b) should remain the exclusive provision gov-
erning venue in patent infringement actions.
IV. SUBSEQUENT DEcisiONS
Several federal district courts have addressed the question of proper venue
in patent infringement actions since the Amendment became effective in Feb-
ruary of 1989. Understandably, the Amendment has cast doubt where there
was once confidence. In these recent cases, patentees have asserted that
amended section 1391(c) may be used to supplement the patent venue statute.
Alleged infringers argue that Fourco is controlling, and therefore, section
1400(b) exclusively governs patent infringement cases. As the following analy-
sis of the recent case law shows, the patentees' argument may succeed.
The amendment to section 1391(c) was interpreted favorably to the paten-
tees in the case of Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equipment Co.3 01 The
Century court held that venue as to a corporate defendant, Vulcan Equipment
Company, Inc. ("Vulcan Inc.") was proper in the Eastern District of Tennes-
see.3° 2 Vulcan Inc. was the United States sister corporation of the Canadian-
based defendant, Vulcan Equipment Company, Ltd. The plaintiff asserted that
Vulcan Inc. subjected itself to the jurisdiction and venue of the Tennessee
court by "carrying out substantial trade and business within Tennessee, in-
cluding the sale of infringing tow trucks within the district. '30 3 The court
found that, for purposes of section 1400(b), "'resides' is defined as any judi-
cial district in which [a defendant corporation in a patent infringement suit] is
subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."'" The
299. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
300. There is also nothing in the legislative history indicating an intent to restrict this definition
of corporate residence to chapter 87 as opposed to venue provisions which appear elsewhere in the
Code (in which case the language change could be read to indicate a restriction on 1391(c)). See
supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text; see also 39 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) No. 974, at 426 (Mar. 29, 1990). The Journal comments:
[T]he language of general applicability added to § 1391(c) in 1988-"For purposes of
venue under this chapter, a corporation shall be deemed to reside"-does not seem
significantly different from the general applicability language construed by the
Fourco Court-"such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such cor-
poration for venue purposes."
id.
301. 733 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), appeal granted, 902 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
302. Century, 733 F. Supp. at 1174.
303. Id. at 1171.
304. Id. at 1173 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)).
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court's reading of amended section 1391(c) was based on that section's plain
meaning.300
This holding gives new meaning to the first clause of section 1400(b). Under
Fourco, for purposes of section 1400(b), "resides" is defined as the district in
which the defendant corporation is incorporated. 06 Vulcan was neither incor-
porated in Tennessee nor did it have its principal place of business in Tennes-
see. 07 Thus, under Fourco, venue is not proper as to Vulcan in Tennessee
under the first clause of section 1400(b).
In addition, as a result of the new and broad meaning given to the first
clause of section 1400(b), the court did not find it necessary to address
whether Vulcan had committed acts of infringement and had a regular and
established place of business in Tennessee.3 °8 The second clause of section
1400(b) is superfluous under this construction of the venue statutes since the
requirements of personal jurisdiction will always satisfy the requirements of
the second clause of section 1400(b). 09
In Century, the court accepted the plaintiff's argument that the amendment
to section 1391(c) substantially broadened the venue statutes despite the fact
that it was "unable to find any express authority for the proposition that Con-
gress intended to supplement section 1400(b)."310 Similarly, in Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,"' the District Court for the
Northern District of California agreed with the Century court that the amend-
ment to section 1391(c) modified section 1400(b). The court held that Con-
gress is presumed to legislate with knowledge of judicial precedent. 12 Other
district courts have held differently. In both Doelcher Products, Inc. v. Hydro-
foil International, Inc.,3 and Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Amerace Corp.,31"
the courts found that patent venue as to corporations was not affected by the
general venue statute section -1391(c). Each of these decisions was based on
305. Id. at 1174.
306. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
307. Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 1170, 1171 (E.D. Tenn.
1989), appeal granted, 902 F.2d 43 (Fed. Cir. 1990)..
308. Id. at 1174.
309. Id. The court stated:
[T]he first clause of § 1400(b) is given new meaning insofar as the definition of resi-
dency has been changed in accordance with revised § 1391(c). The Court acknowl-
edges that the second clause of § 1400(b) becomes superfluous under the facts of this
case in view of the construction given to § 1400(b) in combination with § 1391(c).
However, the plain language of § 1391(c) indicates that the new definition of resi-
dency must be applied across the board to all venue provisions found in Chapter 87.
Id.
310. Id. at 1172.
31!. 734 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
312. Id. at 913 (stating that "in the absence of any clear legislative statement to the contrary,
the court cannot conclude that Congress was unaware of, and thus did not intend, the effect its
amendment of section 1391(c) would have upon the definition of corporate residence in section
1400(b)").
313. 735 F. Supp. 666 (D. Md. 1989).
314. 729 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Il. 1990).
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the same rationale. First, it has long been settled that venue in patent actions
is governed solely and exclusively by section 1400(b); " second, the legislative
history of the Amendment gives no indication of an intent to substantively
alter section 1400(b)." 6 Thus, these courts did not follow the plain meaning
rule, and instead adopted the Fourco analysis."1 7
As the preceding discussion of the case law following the amendment to
section 1391(c) demonstrates, courts will have problems interpreting amended
section 1391(c). The literal language of amended section 1391(c) clearly ex-
tends its definition of corporate residence to section 1400(b).3 18 On the other
hand, well-settled case law has held that section 1400(b) exclusively governs
venue in patent infringement actions. 19 In addition, Congress expressed an
intent, when amending section 1391(c), only to restrict venue in multidistrict
states. 3 2 0 The district courts have not been consistent in finding either the lit-
eral language or the prior case law determinative.32 This will undoubtedly
lead to forum shopping, an evil that is especially prevalent in patent cases.
The effect of the Amendment may come as a surprise to alleged patent
infringers. The well-settled rule of Fourco has been undermined implicitly by
the Amendment. If the courts choose to follow the plain language of amended
section 1391(c), as the Century court did,3 2 2 the result will be the effective
overruling of thirty-three years of Supreme Court precedent, the Fourco case
and its progeny. Century presented the classic Fourco issue of whether the
definition of "resides" in section 1400(b), the patent venue statute, must be
supplemented by the definition of corporate residency in section 1391(c). 3 23
The court concluded that section 1400(b) must be supplemented by section
1391(c) to define corporate residence, based on the plain language of amended
section 1391(c).3 24 The court was compelled to reach this decision by the plain
language of the Amendment. The court, however, also acknowledged that its
interpretation of section 1391(c) effectively redefined the first clause of section
1400(b) and rendered the second clause of section 1400(b) superfluous. 25
There are many practical consequences of this decision. First, section
1400(b), the special venue statute for patent infringement actions, is repealed,
and the standard for corporate amenability to suit in a particular forum be-
315. Doelcher, 735 F. Supp. at 668; Joslyn, 729 F. Supp. at 1222. Judge Moran in Joslyn
stated: "To sustain [plaintiff's] position [that the amendment to section 1391(c) changed the
venue law in patent infringement cases], we would have to have a clear indication of Congres-
sional intent to change the venue rules for patent infringement actions." Joslyn, 729 F. Supp. at
1222.
316. Doelcher, 735 F. Supp. at 668; Joslyn, 729 F. Supp. at 1223.
317. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 189-236 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 301-17 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 301-10 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
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comes "minimum contacts" with that forum district.2 Second, as a result of
the ambiguity in the venue statutes created by the broad language of the
Amendment, litigation on the issue is likely to increase as patentees try to
bring suit wherever they may obtain personal jurisdiction over corporate de-
fendants in patent infringement cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Some courts have interpreted the Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-
tice Act as significantly changing the status of corporations under the federal
venue provisions. Previously, a corporation's "residence," for purposes of venue
in a patent infringement suit, was defined by its place of incorporation. Now,
courts have held that, based on the Act's amendment to section 1391(c), a
corporation's residence for purposes of venue includes any district where per-
sonal jurisdiction exists over that corporation.
These holdings conflict with the Supreme Court's holding, in Fourco, that
section 1400(b) is the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringe-
ment actions. Until Congress expressly indicates an intent to substantively al-
ter the provisions of section 1400(b), Fourco should remain controlling. There
is no mention of any such intent to alter section 1400(b) in the extensive legis-
lative history of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988.
Despite the plain language of amended section 1391(c), the provisions of sec-
tion 1391(c) should not be read to supplement 1400(b), as it is not appropriate
to implicitly repeal section 1400(b).
Matthew J. Sampson
326. See supra notes 32-118 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the mini-
mum contacts standard).
[Vol. 40:207
